We document post-event negative abnormal returns to the (implicit) sell recommendations of a group of fundamental analysts. We also find statistically significant deterioration in the financial performance of the identified firms in the year after the recommendations. Together the results are consistent with the claim of fundamental analysts that they are able to identify firms which are successfully masking operational problems with aggressive accounting. The sample in this study comprises 378 firms identified over a four-year period by the Center for Financial Research and Analysis (CFRA). The CFRA offers to subscribers a monthly report identifying approximately ten firms which CFRA claims are experiencing operational problems and particularly those that employ unusual or aggressive accounting practices to mask the problems. The CFRA analysts rely on traditional techniques of fundamental analysis, including mechanical screens and more time-consuming analyses of footnotes and other public disclosures. Their data sources include only publicly available information, primarily SEC filings. We conclude that the CFRA's apparent success in identifying firms with deteriorating performance provides preliminary evidence about the usefulness of traditional financial statement analysis. The results also provide a strong rationale for future research to identify specific techniques of fundamental analysis that can be employed to detect operational problems masked by aggressi ve accounting practices.
INTRODUCTION
Financial statement analysis as commonly understood encompasses more than computer generated analyses of quantitative financial statement data. Any textbook outlining the techniques of fundamental analysis points out the importance of reading actual SEC filings, not just the financial statement extracts.
A number of accountants and analysts have developed reputations as practitioners of fundamental analysis, and have espoused the usefulness of fundamental analysis in detecting overvalued stocks. 1 Unfortunately, with the exception of two studies investigating the returns to firms identified by Abraham Briloff in Barron's (Foster [1987] , [1979] ), we know of no study investigating the claims of fundamental analysts to uncover operational problems that may be masked by aggressive accounting practices.
2 A key reason has been the absence of a public record of dated investment recommendations generated by analysts relying exclusively upon fundamental analysis.
Our study contributes to research in this area by investigating the analytical ability of the principals associated with the Center for Financial Research and Analysis (hereafter CFRA). 3 CFRA publishes research reports identifying firms with "quality of earnings" problems. According to CFRA analysts, their recommendations are based on information disclosed in publicly available data. Their analytical 4 See "Lucent Net Trails Expectations, Confirming Recent Warnings" (The Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2000) and "Is Healtheon/WebMD Pushing the Limits on Revenue?" (The Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2000) for illustrations of the type of issues covered in CFRA's research reports.
procedures include a combination of mechanical screens on financial statement data and a subsequent analysis of disclosures in SEC filings to identify firms which CFRA believes are masking operational problems with unusual or aggressive accounting. 4 CFRA suggests that the accounting techniques produce poor earnings quality, and implicitly makes a dual prediction: earnings and prices will fall for the identified firms.
We test the claims of CFRA analysts by examining earnings and market returns of firms in the period subsequent to their identification in a research report. The sample includes 378 firms identified over a four-year period. We present two types of evidence consistent with the claims that fundamental analysis can be used to detect overpricing attributable to aggressive accounting. First, we document that financial performance deteriorates significantly in the year following the CFRA report. The median percentage change in EPS decreases by almost 14 percentage points in the four quarters after the CFRA report compared to the four quarters before the CFRA report. The median (annualized) return on equity decreases by about two percentage points across the four fiscal quarters after a CFRA research report compared to the four fiscal quarters preceding the report.
Secondly, we show negative abnormal returns of approximately one percent over a two-day announcement period of the CFRA report, and negative abnormal returns in excess of nine percent over the year following publication of the CFRA report. The deterioration in both earnings and returns is consist ent with the clai ms of the CF RA: the ea rnings de crease suggests that operational probl ems surface subsequent to the CFRA report. The evidence of negative abnormal returns is important in that it demonstr ates tha t the CFRA reports appear to reveal n ew information about eith er opera tional problems or aggressive reporting practices to market participants. 5 Barron's invites a group of eight to twelve participants to their "Roundtable" each year. The participants are described as "Wall Street Superstars" by Barron's and include successful mutual fund managers, stock analysts, and private investors. The participants recommend their "buys" and "sells" and describe the rationale for their picks.
PRIOR RESEARCH
Prior research on the information content of investment advice has most often focused on the informativeness of analysts' recommendations by testing for price reactions to those recommendations (Foster [1987] , [1979] ; Bjerring et al. [1983] ; Lee [1986] ; Desai and Jain [1995] ; Womack [1996] ). Such research has investigated the payoffs to the use of investment advice, but provides no evidence on the usefulness of fundamental analysis to detect poor earnings quality. For example, Barber and Loeffler (1993) analyze recommendations published in the "Dartboard" column of The Wall Street Journal. They find significant publication day returns, but also document that the abnormal ret urns reverse in the days immediately following the publication. No evidence is provided on the subsequent financial performance of the recommended firms.
Desai and Jain (1995) report that investors do not benefit from using the investment advice from another source (Barron's Annual Roundtable) from 1968 to 1991. 5 They document that abnormal returns are essentially zero for one to three year post-publication day holding periods. In contrast, in a comprehensive study of the recommendations from fourteen large brokerage firms, Womack (1996) reports that the analysts from the brokerage firms have market timing as well as stock picking abilities.
Thus there is mixed evidence suggesting that some public recommendations by analysts are potentially useful to market participants.
With the exception of two studies on Abraham Briloff's recommendations (Foster [1987] , [1979] ), these prior studies do not discriminate between the returns to recommendations based upon fundamental analysis and those based upon other sources of information. Foster's evidence of negative market reactions to Abraham Briloff's critiques published in Barron's is the closest we come to finding any evidence justifying the claims of fundamental analysts to detect poor quality earnings. However, because
Foster provides no information on the subsequent financial performance of the firms, one cannot distinguish between a negative market reaction based on Briloff's reputation and one based on valid claims of poor earnings quality.
While the evidence in this study clearly has relevance to the issue of earnings management, it does not relate di rectly to the current literature on the issue. In the aca demic research on "earnings management," the term encompasses accounting policies or entries made by management to effect certain outcomes; motivation is a key part of the definition. More importantly, most of this research depends on a questionable premise: "earnings management " is said to exist when the ac crual component of earnings is something other than what the researcher believed it should have been. When "ex-post" validation of earnings management is sought, the researcher typically tests whether subsequent accruals are of the opposite sign and in excess of what he(she) believes they should have been. To be fair, the researchers' expectations have some objective reality: they are generated by a time series model of accruals, the error from which is identified as "abnormal accruals." Tests on the sign and magnitude of that error are presented as evidence that earnings management does or does not exist in the identified population.
However, the relation of this evidence to anything that financial analysts and investors actually do or care about is not clear.
In this study we take a different approach: first, the phenomenon of interest is not "earnings management," but earnings quality. Whether or not management has intervened to produce a particular accounting outcome is not a consideration: poor quality earnings produced by correct and consistent application of GAAP are also of interest. Secondly, we look for subsequent decreases in firm performance (as well as earnings per share) as evidence of poor earnings quality. We interpret the evidence as confirming the ability of skilled analysts to use financial statement disclosures to detect poor quality earnings, and the failure of the market as a whole to do so. However, because CFRA analysts do not ascribe motivation to the management in reporting earnings, we cannot claim that we provide any evidence on whether or not earnings has been "managed," or whether violations of GAAP have occurred. 6 The CFRA principals claim that their analysts contact the firm and its competitors and ask a series of questions without revealing which firm is the actual "target." Also, they stated that their analysts rarely asks specifics about the problem of interest. Often, the discussions and interviews are simply to confirm their own understandings of revenue recognition or cost capitalization issues. The CFRA princ ipals did state that firms sometimes d ecline to s peak to the m.
It is an open question whether any techniques practiced by CFRA analysts would be of interest to regulatory aut horities responsible for enforcing compliance with GAAP. On the other hand, the earnings and price declines we document are likely to be of interest to analysts and investors.
Central to the research issue is CFRA's claim, which we take at face value, that their analysts use fundamental analysis to identify target firms. A key limitation of this research is that we do not identify any of the methods used by CFRA analysts, nor do we present evidence demonstrating the usefulness of any specific subset of techniques or disclosures used to detect poor quality earnings. Because CFRA is a private, for-profit entity, its principals were understandably reluctant to discuss any specific screens or procedures they use to assess earnings quality. They did confirm that they use a combination of data screens (using Compustat and Lexis-Nexis databases) followed by a numerical and textual analysis of SEC filings. Furthermore, they stated that they did not use any private information from management in identifying firms, although they did say they sometimes sought comments from management before writing up their reports.
6
CFRA promotional literature identifies seven specific accounting maneuvers which it claims its analysts can detect through fundamental analysis: (1) recording revenue too soon, (2) recording "bogus" revenues, (3) boosting income with one-time gains, (4) shifting current expenses to a later period, (5) failing to record or disclose all liabilities, (6) shifting current income to a later period, and (7) shifting future expenses to the current period. The CFRA analysts also explicitly state that data beyond the financial statements is central to the analysis of earnings quality. A list of disclosures scrutinized by CFRA includes footnotes, proxy statements, the President's Letter, Management's Discussion and Analysis of Operations, and auditor's reports.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Our approach to investigating the payoffs to fundamental analysis offers evidence that extends existing research by examining the ability of the CFRA to use, as claimed, fundamental analytical tools to detect poor quality earnings. We compare the earnings changes prior to the CFRA research report dates with earnings changes subsequent to the report dates. In addition to testing the ability of the CFRA analysts to detect deteriorating firm performance, we also investigate returns to a buy-and-hold trading strategy for the 378 firms with available data for the periods after their identification in any of the CFRA research reports over the four-year period, 1994 to 1997.
CFRA Research Report and Financial Statement Data
The CFRA began reporting its monthly research report in January 1994. However, the initial research report was a summary of prior findings by the CFRA's lead analyst over several years, and is excluded from our sample evidence. The second CFRA research report was actually the first research report that identified firms in real time. We include fi rms in our sample with no more than two quarters of missing financial statement data in either the pre-and postpublication periods. Of the final sample, 40 firms have missing financial statement data in either one or two quarters of the pre-or post-publication periods. The results of the tests of differences for ROE and change in )EPS are unchanged when those 40 firms are removed from our sample. Also, of the final sample, 17 firms do not have complete stock price data across all event win dows in our study. When we delete those firms from the tests of stock price behavior subsequent to CFRA publication dates, the conclusions are unchanged. Therefore, the final sample excludes firms with missing data in either Compustat or CRSP, but includes those firms with incomplete data as defined herein. 8 Of the final sample of 378 firms, 72 are the subject of multiple CFRA reports. Each report is included as an independent observation. If those 72 firms are deleted, the conclusions from the tests of differences for ROE and )EPS as well as stock price behavior for each of our event windows are unchanged.
alert," another 20 are excluded due to missing financial statement, and 12 others are removed due to missing stock price data during the event period.
7 Thus, the final sample size is 378 firms.
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Compustat quarterly files provide data on a restated basis. These restatements may include balance sheet or income statement reclassifications, post-merger purchase price adjustments, pooling effects, and/or voluntary or mandatory restatements filed in amended Form 10-Ks or 10-Qs. Table 1 shows the number of CFRA firms for which Compustat coded one or more restatements in the eight quarters prior to the report (we include eight quarters because our measure of change in EPS uses eight fiscal quarters of data). Approximately 46 percent of the CFRA sample had at least one restatement in the eight quarters. This is somewhat higher than the Compustat population, 28 percent of which had a restatement.
This difference in the incidence of restatements in the two populations may suggest that CFRA is successfully identifying firms whose financial results are so compromised that they are forced to restate prior results. However, without determining the nature and timing of each of the restatements in the two populations, we offer that only as an untested conjecture.
The results reported in this paper include all CFRA firms whether or not a restatement occurred in the pre-or post-CFRA report periods. To investigate whether our results are compromised by these restatements, we repeated the tests of differences in financial performance in the pre-and post-CFRA report periods, using a data set purged of all firms with restated data in periods prior to a CFRA report.
The results are robust to this data requirement. More significantly, we repeated all the tests reported in this paper after purging the sample of any firm with a restatement in the relevant pre-or post-CFRA report periods. Our conclusions are also robust to this data requirement. Table 2 shows that only three industries account each for more than 10 percent of the sample. Business services (SIC codes 7300-7399), electrical equipment (3600-3699) and commercial machinery/computers (3500-3599) make up 13, 12, and 11 percent, respectively, of the sample. Thus, the CFRA analysts appear to report on firms across a broad group of industries. Table 3 shows inclusion of a firm in a CFRA report does not appear to be strongly related to a particular fiscal quarter. Although the second and fourth fiscal quarters are somewhat under-represented as the last fiscal quarter financial statement available to CFRA analysts prior to inclusion in a report, the distribution of the reports spans all four fiscal quarters prior to inclusion in CFRA reports. Table 3 also suggests that CFRA analysts report on firms in both NYSE and NASDAQ/other market s, as well as large and small firms (as defined by CFRA's size designations, "small to mid-cap" and "mid to large-cap,"
which CFRA claims are separated at a $1 billion market capitalization level).
For our analysis of CFRA advice, we first examine whether firm performance subsequent to the investment advice has deteriorated as compared with the firm performance prior to the publication date of the advice. For our tests of differences between the periods before and after publication dates of the investment advice, we document earnings changes over the four fiscal quarters available to CFRA analysts prior to and after publication of the research report. For the first 43 months of our sample period, the publication date of the CFRA report was the fifteenth of each month, thereby arriving to subscribers the following day; the publication date was changed to the twentieth of each month beginning with the September 1997 report. If the earnings announcement date occurs on or before the fifteenth (twentieth beginning September 1997) of the month, we assume the CFRA analysts had access to the 9 In some cases this assumption biases against our finding evidence of the CFRA analysts' ability to detect poor quality earnings, since they claim to work only from SEC documents and not from press releases. In the event CFRA issued a report between the release of earnings and the filing of the Forms 10-Q or 10-K, our tests assume they had access to financial statement disclosures in the SEC filing which were in fact unavailabl e to them. This assumption does insure, however , that all earnings data classified as post-report data were in fact unavailable to the CFRA analysts at the date of their report.
10 Shares are adjusted by the adjustment factor at the ex-dividend date.
11 To test the robustness of our conclusions to alternative measures of firm performance, we use, in addition to )EPS, (1) change in EPS scaled by EPS lagged by two fiscal quarters, (2) unscaled changes in EPS, and (3) and change in primary EPS including extraordinary items scaled by the absolute value of seasonally-lagged primary earnings per share including extraordinary items. In each case, the results of tests of differences between fiscal quarters before and after the CFRA publication date are similar to those report ed in th e study.
underlying financial disclosures, including those filed later in the 10-Q or 10-K. 9 That is, the most recent announcement dat e, which we obtain from Compustat, on or before the fifteenth (or twentieth) of the month in which a company is included in the CFRA research report is used as the last fiscal-quarter for our pre-publication period. The subsequent four fiscal quarters are considered the post-publication period.
The variable of interest is change in earnings, )EPS, which we define as:
( 1) where EPS t is defined as income available to common equity excluding extraordinary items, discontinued operations, nonoperating income/expense, and special items (net of tax effects) scaled by common shares for primary earnings per share at the end of quarter t. 10 The result is a seasonally-differenced firm performance measure. We average, by firm, the four fiscal quarters of )EPS in each of the pre-and post-publication periods to test differences in firm financial performance across the pre-and postpublication periods. We also compare average return on equity (ROE) in four quarters immediately before the CFRA report to average ROE in the four quarters after the CFRA report. Additionally, we decompose ROE into profit margin, asset turnover, and leverage to offer insights into differences in the components of ROE. We also specify the abnormal returns based on standardized abnormal returns by estimating the market model over a 255-day period ending both thirty and zero days prior to the beginning of the event periods of interest, as well as by estimating the model equally over the pre-and post-event periods. We further estimate comparison period abnormal returns by subtracting the mean return of the common stock over a 255-day period ending both thirty and zero days prior to the begi nning of th e event peri ods. Fin ally, we alternatively estimate abnormal returns using an equally-weighted market index. The results obtained from each alternative abnormal return specification are consistent with those reported and have no effect on our conclusions. We also perform nonparametric tests based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test and a rank test described in Corrado (1989) . The results are robust to the use of these alternative (nonparametric) test procedures .
The Behavior of Stock Prices Around CFRA Publication Dates
Our comparison of firm performance before and after the CFRA research reports offers no evidence as to whether the deterioration in performance anticipated by the CFRA analysts is also anticipated by the market and impounded into the stock price at the date of the CFRA report. Therefore, we also examine stock prices coincident with and subsequent to the CFRA publication date. Evidence of abnormal returns around the publication date of the CFRA report is consistent with the data offered by CFRA being informative to market participants and not previously impounded into stock prices.
However, market participants might also speculate on the information contained in the CFRA research reports and thus long window returns are also examined to provide evidence that any publication date (windows) returns do not reverse.
We measure the behavior of stock prices by estimating buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The estimation techniques for abnormal returns reported in the study use two alternative specifications of return indices. A size (market capitalization) portfolio return index and a value-weighted return index are used to estimate CFRA sample abnormal returns.
12 Appendix 1 provides further descriptive information on the abnormal return estimation procedures.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We calculate firm performance measures for the four quarters in the periods before and after release of the CFRA report. These measures require eight fiscal quarters of data since our primary variable of interest, )EPS, is defined as the change in EPS from the previous period scaled by each previous period's 13 Since outliers are present in the data, trimmed and Winsorized means are estimated to produce more robust estimators of the population mean which are relatively insensitive to the outlying values. The trimmed mean is computed after the k smallest and k largest observations are deleted from the sample. The Winsorized mean is computed after the k smallest observations are replaced by the (k+1) smallest observation, and the k largest observations are replaced by the (k+1) largest observation. In other words, the observations are Winsorized at each end. A 10 percent Winsorization method (where k = 38) is used for the reported data in the study. Tests were reperformed using a 5 percent Winsorization method, a trimming of means at 10 and 5 percent, and without any controls for the effects of outliers. The conclusions are unchanged.
14 In all cases, t-tests on the differences in means of )EPS and ROE are consistent with the Wilcoxon signed rank tests reported here. If using parametric t-tests of differences in the variables, we find evidence of significant differences in )EPS (t = -9.08), ROE (t = -2.94), PM (t = -3.19), and ATO (t = -5.07).
(in absolute value) EPS. The data provide the four most recent )EPS variables from which we calculate an average firm performance measure for each of the 378 observations. The process is repeated for each of the four fiscal quarters after the CFRA research report. Average values of ROE and its components are similarly calculated. However, ROE and its components are levels rather than first-differenced variables, and we test for differences in the levels of these signals of firm performance before and after inclusion in CFRA research reports.
To evaluate the ability of CFRA analysts to forecast deteriorating firm performance, we evaluate the pre-and post-CFRA report periods for tests of paired differences in )EPS, as well as ROE and its components. The results are reported in table 5. In Panels A and B, the measures of firm performance before and after the CFRA report are shown, respectively. The table reports the mean, standard error, median, and percentage of means greater than zero for the periods before and after the CFRA reports.
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To test whether CFRA analysts appear to be able to forecast deteriorating firm performance, we use the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test on the paired differences in )EPS, ROE, and its components.
14 In panel C, the differences between measures of firm performance are reported. In each case, the variable of interest, except for the leverage component to ROE, is lower in the period after the CFRA report as compared to the period before the CFRA report. However, the evidence suggests that only )EPS, ROE, and profit margin are significantly lower after the CFRA report is made. Figure 1 shows the (average) change in primary earnings per share ()EPS) and annualized return on equity (ROE). The figure shows that each variable appears to begin a deterioration process in quarters one and two.
However, the deterioration in each continues through the fourth fiscal quarter following inclusion in CFRA research reports. The results are consistent with the claims of the CFRA analysts regarding their focus on detecting deteriorating operating performance. The evidence also suggests the CFRA analysts use triggers that predict deteriorating (marginal) returns to revenues as profit margins are significantly lower after the CFRA report. Thus, the evidence seems consistent with the claims of CFRA analysts as they appear to be able to predict deteriorating firm performance.
Indications of deteriorating signals of firm performance offer no evidence as to whether the CFRA analysts offer new information to the market. Thus, we also examine stock prices coincident with and subsequent to the CFRA publication date. Table 6 presents summary results for the 378 observations with available stock price data. For the sample, we report the average and median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each interval. We report tests using parametric and nonparametric procedures on the average abnormal returns. Table 6 reports that the publication two-day event period [0, +1] shows a negative announcement effect with mean (median) CARs of -1.11 (-0.67) percent using size decile portfolios for market index returns. Table 6 also reports abnormal returns using a CRSP value-weighted benchmark. The results of either specification of abnormal returns suggests that market participants react to CFRA research reports.
Additional negative abnormal returns over other reported intervals suggests that new unfavorable information is released to the market in the period after publication of the CFRA reports. Subsequent to the announcement, abnormal return intervals are consistently negative. For example, the abnormal return intervals of one, two, three, and four quarters show mean (median) CARs of -3.72 (-0.29) percent, -6.22 (-3.16) percent, -7.98 (-2.78) percent, and -9.57 (-2.85) percent, respectively, for size-indexed returns.
The evidence of negative CARs is robust, and in most cases much stronger for alternative specifications of a market index (e.g., CRSP value-weighted, also reported; CRSP equally-weighted or comparison period returns, not reported) or alternative estimation procedure for abnormal returns (see footnote 12).
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Womack (1996) documents a similar drift in his portfolio of "sell" recommendations made by analysts at fourteen major U.S. brokerage firms. Ball and Brown (1968) were the first to document such a drift (see also Bernard and Thomas [1989] , [1990] ).
These resul ts suggest that the speculation explanat ion is not a reasonable explanation for the negative abnormal returns to the CFRA research reports as the announcement period abnormal returns do not reverse as would be suggested by the speculation explanation. Additionally, we find evidence of abnormal returns over two-year return window subsequent to inclusion in CFRA reports. The results suggest that investors may under react to CFRA reports, as well as subsequent earnings announcements, for the set of CFRA firms.
We present graphical evidence of the behavior of abnormal returns surrounding CFRA reports in figure 2. The evidence in figure 2 shows the daily abnormal returns from 250 trading days prior to the announcement date up to 250 trading days after the announcement. The graphical evidence shows that the portfolio of CFRA firms experiences positive cumulative abnormal returns prior to the report.
However, daily (cumulative) abnormal returns turn negative on or about the CFRA announcement date and are consistently negative throughout the period shown. Figure 2 suggests some leakage of the information, or alternatively that market participants find other sources for the CFRA data, at approximately ten days prior to the report. Although not reported, we also test the ten daily abnormal returns during the period from -10 to -1 trading days. The results show significant negative abnormal returns for days [-5] and [-7] at 10 percent significance level. Two days of significant negative abnormal returns over ten days of interest may also simply be due to chance. Thus, evidence suggests that the accounting analysts' information is new to market participants and not fully impounded into stock prices at announcement dates. 15 We further analyze the abnormal returns by year. Figure 3 shows graphically the results of those tests. The first year of the CFRA research report does not appear to yield negative abnormal returns.
Tests confirm that neither announcement date nor subsequent period returns are significantly negative.
However, for each of the remaining years, the graphical evidence suggests a change in the direction of abnormal returns on or about the release of CFRA research reports. Tests confirm that both announcement date and subsequent period returns are significantly negative for each of the remaining years. Equally interesting is the increasing magnitudes of the negative returns. Apparently, investors either are assigning a reputation to CFRA research reports that leads to increasingly negative returns and/or CFRA analysts are becoming more skilled at anticipating the release of information confirming their predictions regarding deteriorating financial performance. Table 7 shows that CFRA firms fall disproportionately into the high ROE ()EPS) deciles.
SUPPLEMENTAL TESTS

Sensitivity of Results to High )EPS and ROE Screens
Therefore, we test the sensitivity of the results by evaluating whether CFRA analysts simply anticipate mean reversion in )EPS or ROE. We sort firms with available data in Compustat into deciles for each quarter, based on the average ROE ()EPS) over the prior four quarters. We then match each CFRA firm, by quarter, to the appropriate decile based on the firm's average ROE ()EPS) over the four quarters prior to the report. We subtract the median ROE ()EPS) for the control firms in the decile (by quarter) from the ROE ()EPS) of each of the CFRA firms in the same decile (also by quarter). Thus, the financial performance of the CFRA firms in each decile is adjusted for the average mean reversion exhibited by the firms in the that quarter.
CFRA firms in five of the ten ROE deciles (representing 65 percent of the total CFRA firms) show statistically significant decreases in ROE in excess of the control sample. Simil arly, CFRA firms in five of the ten )EPS deciles (representing 79 percent of the total CFRA firms) show statistically significant decreases in )EPS in excess of the control sample. Therefore, we conclude that CFRA does more than anticipate mean reversion in the financial performance of the firms it identifies.
Relation to an Accrual Accounting-Based Anomaly
Sloan (1996) reports that stock prices do not reflect the information content of the cash and accrual components of earnings fully until it impacts future earnings. The result is related to our study if analysts, such as CFRA analysts, choose fundamental signals that simply proxy for the "accrual anomaly." That is, Sloan shows abnormal stock returns are significantly negative for the three highest portfolios formed by assigning firms into deciles based on the magnitude of accruals. If the fundamental signals used by CFRA classify firms according to the same economic phenomenon that results in the accrual anomaly, we should see evidence in our sample of a disproportionate number of firms in the highest porfolio based on accrual rankings.
For our sample, we calculate accruals as shown in Sloan (1996) for the most recent annual period prior to each firm being included in the CFRA research report. For our sample, 32.3 percent of the observations appear in the highest quartile using annual data obtained one annual period before the CFRA report. The proportion varies from that expected by a random assignment (25 percent), but is (perhaps substantially) below the proportion expected if the fundamental signals used by CFRA analysts capture the economic phenomenon that result in the accrual anomaly. When the firms in the top accrual quartile are deleted from our sample and the tests of excess returns are performed, the resulting portfolio continues to exhibit significantly negative announcement date and subsequent period returns (not reported in tables).
Small versus Large Firm Returns
In table 8, we report CARs for the 378 CFRA firms partitioned on a size variable as designated in CFRA reports. Beginning with the first report in 1995, CFRA reports use a size classification of "small to mid" and "mid to large" which effectively doubled the number of firms on which reports were written, as each classification continued to include approximately five alerts per month. Negative abnormal returns are observed in both size portfolios. For the larger firms, however, the returns are somewhat smaller and do not appear until the second quarter after the release of the CFRA report. This result is consistent with prior evidence that has shown that marginal information content of financial disclosures (e.g., earnings announcements) decrease with firm size. It may also be consistent with evidence showing that analyst following increases with firm size (e.g., see Bhushan [1989 ], Freeman [1987 ).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study tests whether there is evidence supporting the claims of fundamental analysts to be able to forecast deteriorating firm performance. We also test whether the information in the analysts' research reports is impounded into the market price of subject firms at the date of the report. The evidence supports the claims that the analysts are able to anticipate deteriorating firm performance. That is, we find the firms identified by the analysts have deteriorating firm performance in the year following the report. Deteriorating performance is evident from changes in earnings per share, returns on equity, and profit margins.
Additionally, we document significantly negative abnormal returns to the portfolio of firms identified in the analysts' reports. Not only is the announcement date return significantly negative, but the abnormal returns to a buy and hold strategy are also significantly negative for up to two years subsequent to the date of the research report. The results suggest that investors may under react to CFRA reports, as well as subsequent earnings announcements, for the set of CFRA firms. The evidence also suggests that the speculation explanation is not a reasonable explanation for the negative abnormal returns to the CFRA research reports as the announcement period abnormal returns do not reverse as would be suggested by the speculation explanation.
Central to our interpretation of the results is the claim of the analysts associated with the CFRA use only publicly available information to generate their research reports. With that caveat noted, we conclude that fundamental analysis can be used to detect signals of deteriorating firm performance, and that these signals in publicly available data are not priced by the market. We do not address the question of which forms or methods of financial statement analysis are used by the CFRA analysts, or whether, in fact, their results could be replicated by other analysts. Future research may identify a combination of screens and procedures which could be used to replicate the success of the CFRA analysts.
APPENDIX 1
The abnormal return (AR) for CFRA firms is computed as follows: ,
where is the rate of return on the common stock of the jth firm on day t, is the observed return on the market index m (i.e., either a size portfolio return or a return on a broader market index) for day t. We refer the abnormal return at the publication date (denoted as two-day event window) of the CFRA report or abnormal returns over multiple tr ading days as a cumul ative abnormal return (CAR). Using a buy-and-hold returns strategy to estimate sample abnormal returns over an interval of two or more trading days beginning with T 1 , and ending with T 2 , we define each CAR as:
.
(2) The table provides descriptive statistics of the 378 observations contained in CFRA reports with available data from February 1994 (first research report by CFRA using the "alert" format) to December 1997. Thirty-two industries are represented in the last group of 178 observations with five or fewer observations from any other industry classification. Industries are classified by use of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes and code names. The 1997 SIC manual, which defines industries in accordance with the composition and structure of the economy and attempts to cover the entire field of economic activities, is the reference source for SIC code assignments. (Primary, Supplemental, Tertiary; Full-Coverage; and Industrial Research Files) .
EPS t = income available to common equity excluding extraordinary items, discontinued operations, nonoperating income/expense, and special items (net of tax effects) divided by common shares for primary earnings per share (adjusted for stock dividends and splits) at the end of quarter t.
)EPS t = the change in earnings per share for quarter t, defined as (EPS t -EPS t-4 ) deflated by absolute value of EPS t-4 , to yield a seasonally differenced change in earnings per share. The )EPS in each of the four fiscal quarters in the pre-and postpublication periods are averaged to produce the final variables of interest.
ROE t = income available to common equity excluding extraordinary items and discontinued operations at the end of quarter t divided by average common equity at the end of quarter t where the average is the calculated using beginning and ending values of common equity at the end of quarter t. The variable is averaged across the four fiscal quarters in both the pre-and post-publication periods.
PM t = operating income after depreciation (before interest, taxes, and special items) divided by sales(net) at the end of quarter t.
ATO t = sales (net) at the end of quarter t divided by average assets at the end of quarter t where the average is the calculated using beginning and ending values of total assets at the end of quarter t.
LEV t = average assets at the end of quarter t where the average is the calculated using beginning and ending values of total assets at the end of quarter t divided by average common equity at the end of quarter t where the average is the calculated using beginning and ending values of common equity at the end of quarter t. b ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and10% levels, respectively, using the Wilcoxon signed rank tests for differences in means and median scores tests for the differences in medians. Significance levels are based on one-tailed tests. is the public release date of each CFRA report over the sample period, where PD = 0 in event time. Median and average CARs are reported for each event window and market index used to estimate the abnormal returns to the sample. The estimation techniques for abnormal returns reported in the study utilize two alternative specifications of return indices. A size (market capitalization) portfolio return index (SI) and a valueweighted return index (VW) are used to estimate CFRA sample abnormal returns. In the table, we report a two-day event window around the publication date, and event windows approximating a successive aggregation of the first four quarters of abnormal returns inclusive of and subsequent to the publication date, as well as event windows that approximate two years following the publication dates. We assume that a period covering 250 trading days is approximately equal to one fiscal year.
b The specifications for the abnormal returns are described in Appendix 1. We also perform nonparametric tests based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test and the rank test described in Corrado (1989) . Using the nonparamtric test procedures, the results suggest that abnormal returns are significantly different from zero for all event windows in one-tailed tests at less than 10%.
*, **, *** denote si gnifica ntly di fferent from zero in a one -taile d test a t 10%, 5 %, 1%, r espect ively. Beginning with the first report in 1995, CFRA reports use a size classification of "small to mid" and "mid to large" cap (i.e., market capitalization levels) of the stocks. Median and average CARs are reported for each event window and market index used to estimate th e abnormal r eturns to the sample. The estimatio n techniq ues for abn ormal retur ns report ed in the st udy utili ze two alternative specifications of return indices. A size (market capitalization) portfolio return index (SI) and a value-weighted return index (VW) are used to estimate CFRA sample abnormal returns.
b The specifications for t he abnormal returns and the test statisti c for parametric procedu res are described in App endix 1. We also perform nonparametric tests based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test and the rank test described in Corrado (1989) . Using the nonparametric test procedures, the conclusions are qualitatively similar to those using the results of parametric tests.
*, **, *** denote si gnifica ntly di fferent from zero in a one -taile d test a t 10%, 5 %, 1%, r espect ively. The figure shows the (average) change in primary earnings per share ()EPS) and return on equity (ROE). See table 4 for variable definitions. To better approximate annual firm performance measure, ROE is annualized. The sample includes 378 observations contained in CFRA research reports from February 1994 to December 1997. The vertical line between QTR-1 and QTR +1 is an approximation of the CFRA report releases. Each quarterly EPS prior to CFRA report release date includes publicly available financial data released prior to the CFRA publication date. Each quarterly EPS after the CFRA report release date includes the publicly available subsequent to the CFRA report that included a research report on the sample of firms. The figure shows the cumulative (average) abnormal returns of the portfolio of firms reported in CFRA reports during the sample period. The estimation techniques for abnormal returns reported in the study utilize two alternative specifications of return indices. In this figure we document abnormal returns using a size (market capitalization) portfolio return index (SI). We assume that a period covering 250 trading days is approximately equal to one fiscal year. The sample of CFRA reports span February 1994 to the December 1997 report dates. The market adjusted (average) abnormal returns are cumulated beginning with one year before inclusion (approximated by the 250 trading days before CFRA publication date) in a CFRA report up to one year after. The vertical line at trading date zero represents an approximation of the CFRA report release dates. The figure shows the cumulative (average) abnormal returns of the portfolio of firms reported in CFRA reports during the sample period. Each year of the sample period is shown. See Figure 2 for additional descriptive information on the market benchmark used. The market adjusted (average) abnormal returns are cumulated beginning with one year before inclusion (approximated by the 250 trading days before CFRA publication date) in CFRA reports and ending with one year after inclusion in the CFRA reports. The vertical line at trading date zero represents an approximation of the CFRA report release dates.
